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1. Introduction and Motivation
The normative foundations of the comparison of distributions of a single attribute between
a given number of individuals are by now well-established. They originate in the equivalence
between three statements that are considered relevant answers to the question of when a
distribution x can be considered normatively better than a distribution y. These statements,
the equivalence of which was ¯rst established by Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1952) and
popularized later on among economists by Kolm (1969), Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett (1973),
Sen (1997), Fields and Fei (1978) among others, are the following:
(i) Distribution x can be obtained from distribution y by means of a ¯nite sequence of
progressive { or equivalently Pigou-Dalton { transfers.
(ii) All utilitarian ethical observers who assume that individuals convert the attribute into
well-being by means of the same concave utility function rank distribution x above distribu-
tion y.
(iii) The poverty gap is lower in distribution x than in distribution y whatever the poverty
line, or equivalently the Lorenz curve of distribution x lies everywhere above that of y.
This remarkable result, which can be generalised in a number of ways, points to three di®erent
dimensions of the inequality measurement process.1 The ¯rst statement aims at capturing
the very notion of inequality reduction by associating it with elementary transformations of
the distributions. The second statement is fundamentally normative and it assumes that
society has an aversion to inequality which, in the utilitarian framework, is captured by the
concavity of the utility function. To some extent the ¯rst statement helps in clarifying the
meaning of the restriction imposed on the utility function in the second statement. While
these two conditions shed light on two di®erent facets of the inequality concept, they do
not prove very useful for deciding in practice when one distribution is more unequal than
another. This is particularly true for the second statement which requires an in¯nite number
of comparisons to be made before a distribution can be declared less unequal than another.
The third statement resolves this problem by providing easily implementable criteria that
allow one to recover the ranking of distributions implied by the ¯rst and second statements.
The last condition can also been interpreted as a means of identifying those pairs of
distributions for which a consensus prevails among all inequality averse utilitarian ethical
] We would like to thank Stephen Bazen, Marc Fleurbaey and an anonymous referee whose useful comments
helped us to improve the paper. In particular the critical examination of our paper by Marc Fleurbaey led
us to reconsider some of our original positions. Needless to say, the authors bear the entire responsibility for
remaining errors and de¯ciencies.
1As shown by Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett (1973) the equivalence continues to hold when more °exible social
welfare functionals are substituted for the utilitarian one. It is also possible to extend this result to the case
where the distributions under comparison have di®ering means by adapting appropriately each of these three
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observers. If the Lorenz curves { or equivalently the poverty gap pro¯les { of two distributions
do not intersect, then all the utilitarian ethical observers who have some aversion to inequality
will rank these distributions in the same way. If, on the contrary, the Lorenz curves of two
distributions cross, then it is always possible to ¯nd two such ethical observers who will rank
these distributions in the opposite way. This points to what may be considered an inherent
limitation of this approach: it is very unlikely that the above conditions will allow one to
rank conclusively all the distributions under consideration. Actually this pessimistic view is
exaggerated and there is empirical evidence that the comparison of the Lorenz curves permits
conclusive verdicts to be obtained in a signi¯cant number of cases.2 Nevertheless, the Lorenz
criterion is often considered to be a ¯rst round approach which must be supplemented by
the use of ethically more demanding indices in a second stage. It is traditional practice to
require that these summary indices be compatible with any of the conditions of the Hardy-
Littlewood-Polya result (see e.g. Foster (1985)).
Remarkable as they are, these foundations strictly concern distributions of a single at-
tribute which is typically identi¯ed with individual income. However the ability of income
alone to measure a person's well-being has been seriously challenged during the last thirty
years and there has been an increasing concern for a more comprehensive approach. The focus
on income is to a large extent justi¯ed on the assumption that it provides a good measure of
the level of well-being achieved by an individual who behaves rationally in a comprehensive
and fully competitive market environment. This neglects the fact that a number of com-
modities that contribute to a person's well-being cannot be given market values. Typical
instances are amenities like recreational areas or publicly provided services like education or
health care, for which markets are imperfect or even do not exist. Also, attributes such as
family circumstances or health status a®ect a person's well-being but cannot be related to
income. The recognition that a person's well-being cannot be fully summarized by income
alone calls for a multidimensional approach to welfare and inequality measurement. The mul-
tidimensional nature of well-being is also at the heart of the capability approach developed
by Sen (1985), where the functionings are generally associated with attributes such as health,
educational level, but in no way with income alone. A practical instance of the capability
approach is given by the human development index (HDI) of the United Nations, which ag-
gregates in a single measure information about a country's literacy rate and attendance rates
at primary, secondary and higher education, life expectancy at birth and GDP per capita.
While the HDI represents an improvement upon existing measures of national well-being, it
must be recognized that the aggregation procedure used in its de¯nition is rather speci¯c. A
further di±culty is that the HDI is not sensitive to the inequality within any of the dimensions
2Sophisticated statistical inference techniques have been designed in order to test the robustness of the ranking
of distributions based on the comparisons of the Lorenz curves. For instance, application of such techniques
to the comparisons of ten countries from the Luxembourg Income Study database allowed Bishop, Formby
and Smith (1993) to obtain conclusive verdicts in 34 out of 45 possible cases.
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considered.3
While the last thirty years have witnessed a number of contributions that have proposed
dominance criteria for comparing distributions of several attributes, one has to admit that
the theory has not attained a degree of achievement comparable to that of the unidimensional
approach. The Hardy-Littlewood-Polya result suggests three possible routes to address the
question of the measurement of multidimensional inequality. The ¯rst of these { illustrated by
Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) { is to impose particular conditions on the utility function
that are assumed to capture the aversion to multidimensional inequality and to explore their
implications for the ranking of the situations under comparison. The main purpose is to ¯nd
implementable dominance tests that permit one to check if it is possible to reach a consensus
among these well-de¯ned classes of social welfare functionals. Building on the results of Hadar
and Russell (1974) in the multidimensional risk literature, Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982)
have shown that ¯rst and second-order multidimensional stochastic dominance imply una-
nimity of judgements among all utilitarians for speci¯c classes of utility functions. They have
also suggested that an equivalence between their multidimensional stochastic dominance cri-
teria and utilitarian unanimity might hold. Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) have proposed
a nice interpretation of their stochastic dominance criteria in the speci¯c case where there are
only two attributes, one of which is income and the other one an ordinal index of needs such
as the household size. Their criteria and equivalence results, developed originally for distri-
butions of attributes with an identical marginal distribution of needs, have been subsequently
extended by Jenkins and Lambert (1993) and Bazen and Moyes (2003) to more general situ-
ations. Bourguignon (1989) has proposed an interesting empirically implementable criterion,
that lies in between the ¯rst and second order criteria of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982).
He further identi¯ed the restrictions that have to be placed on the utility functions in order
that the ranking of distributions agreed by all utilitarians coincides with that implied by his
criterion.4 However it is in general unclear what the meaning of the conditions to be satis¯ed
by the utility functions is, unless one is able to uncover the underlying transformations of the
distributions.
The second route consists in introducing particular transformations of the situations which
aim at capturing the very idea of inequality reduction in a multidimensional context, and
in deriving the properties of the utility function that guarantee that welfare increases as the
result of such transformations. That was the strategy chosen by Kolm (1977), who considered
the multiplication by a bistochastic matrix as the appropriate generalization of the idea of
inequality reduction in a multidimensional framework. He proved that, if a situation is
3It follows that the HDI may record an improvement in a country's well-being even though inequality in the
distribution of health, education or income has increased. Foster, Lopez-Calva and Sz¶ ekely (2005) propose
a re¯nement of the HDI that is distributive-sensitive and show that substitution of this new measure to the
original HDI considerably changes the way societies have ranked.
4Fleurbaey, Hagner¶ e and Trannoy (2003) have shown that it is possible to re¯ne Bourguignon's (1989) criterion
by introducing equivalence scales and allowing these to vary within prede¯ned intervals.
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obtained from another one by means of such a transformation, then the former situation is
ranked above the latter by all the utilitarian ethical observers who evaluate the individuals'
well-being by means of a concave utility function, and conversely. Kolm's (1977) approach
avoids the di±culty inherent in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) by making clear what is
meant by inequality reduction and then by identifying the normative judgements consistent
with it. On the other hand the elementary transformation he considers is rather speci¯c: it
consists in transferring an identical fraction of each attribute from one individual to another.
This imposes very particular restrictions on the equalizing { in Kolm's terminology rectifying
{ process which rules out very natural extensions of the idea of a progressive transfer in
a multidimensional setting. More importantly he did not produce a criterion that would
implement the utilitarian unanimity over the class of concave utility functions.
The third route was followed by Koshevoy (1995) who suggested the use of the Lorenz
zonotope as a generalization of the Lorenz curve in the multidimensional framework. Among
other things, he proved that a su±cient condition for a distribution to dominate another
one according to his criterion { the Lorenz zonotope of the former distribution is included
in the Lorenz zonotope of the latter { is that it can be obtained from the latter through
multiplication by a bistochastic matrix. However, this does not tell us a lot about the implicit
equalization process embedded in the Lorenz zonotope criterion since the converse statement
does not hold. It can actually be shown that there exist transformations { di®erent from those
obtained by multiplication by a bistochastic matrix { that are compatible with the Lorenz
zonotope criterion. Furthermore Koshevoy (1995) did not provide any indication about the
properties of the utility function that would guarantee that the ranking of distributions
generated by the unanimity among all utilitarian ethical observers coincide with that implied
by the Lorenz zonotope criterion. Nor did he give evidence that the welfarist approach
to inequality measurement is compatible with the Lorenz zonotope quasi-ordering.5 While
the welfare criterion considered by Kolm implies Koshevoy's quasi-ordering, the converse
implication does not hold, and it is therefore di±cult to justify the use of the Lorenz zonotope
from a normative standpoint.
This brief review of the literature indicates that the best that can be achieved is to
provide equivalences between the unanimity among those utilitarian ethical observers who
subscribe to some common values and, either an implementable criterion (Atkinson and
Bourguignon (1982)), or a speci¯c equalizing transformation (Kolm (1977)). In particular,
none of the above contributions hint at the elementary transformations, which if performed
a ¯nite number of times, would be equivalent to the proposed dominance criteria. It is
fair to recognize that the elementary transformations that were believed to lie behind the
above-mentioned criteria have been discussed by various authors, including Atkinson and
Bourguignon (1982) themselves, Ebert (2000) and Moyes (1999). However none of these
5Rigorously speaking the fact that the Lorenz zonotope cannot be given a utilitarian { and possibly a welfarist
{ justi¯cation does not mean that there exists no social welfare functions consistent with it.
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papers has made a decisive step by proving that, if a distribution is ranked above another
distribution by a criterion, then it is possible to obtain the dominating distribution from the
dominated one by successive applications of appropriate transformations. In short, despite
the relative wealth of attempts made in this direction during the last thirty years, there seems
to be no multidimensional analogue to the Hardy-Littlewood-Polya equivalence result. In this
paper, we aim at providing a step towards establishing such an equivalence for the case where
there are only two attributes to be distributed, one of which has a cardinal nature while the
other is only ordinally measurable.
Focusing on bidimensional distributions might look restrictive but it provides a simple
enough structure in which the basic problem we are interested can be addressed. Most re-
sults extend to the general case where there are more than two attributes but this introduces
additional complexity at the risk of making the main points less accessible. Our asymmet-
ric treatment of the two attributes is certainly more disputable but there are a number of
instances where only ordinal information is conveyed by the value of the attribute. For in-
stance one may be interested in the evaluation of income distributions for households, who
di®er in size and composition as in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) or Bourguignon (1989).
Even though precise information is provided concerning household composition such as the
number and ages of the family's members, one may be reluctant to assign a cardinal meaning
to the available ¯gures. A similar situation arises when one has to compare the well-being
of di®erent populations on the basis of the joint distributions of income and health status
of their members. Indicators like infant mortality or life expectancy are routinely used for
measuring a person's health status and here again one might be willing to assume that the
only reliable information is of an ordinal nature (see e.g. Allison and Foster (2004)).6 The
consumption of local public goods such as the quality of schooling (see Gravel, Moyes and
Tarroux (2008)) is an other example of an attribute to which one might hesitate to give a
cardinal meaning. On the other hand there is a wide agreement among economists on the fact
that individual income per year { at least when used in a speci¯c price con¯guration { is a
cardinally meaningful attribute. It is therefore not unrealistic to consider two attributes that
cannot be de¯ned with the same degree of precision and which require therefore a di®erent
treatment in normative analysis.
As we emphasized earlier, the Hardy-Littlewood-Polya result provides a natural research
agenda pointing at three di®erent but actually complementary facets of inequality measure-
ment. Our approach is much in line with Kolm's (1977) contribution in that we start with
those elementary transformations which we believe capture the very notion of inequality re-
duction in our bidimensional setting and then look for the restrictions they imply for the
utility function used by the ethical observer to evaluate the distributions. However we depart
from Kolm's suggestion in a number of respects that will prove to be crucial for overcoming
6An important issue, which is particularly stressed by Allison and Foster (2004), concerns the implication for
the ranking of the situations under comparisons of a change in the measurement scale of an attribute.
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the limitations of previous studies. There is a large agreement in the profession for assimilat-
ing inequality reduction with progressive transfers when there is a single attribute. Things
appear to be more complicated in the multidimensional framework and no consensus has
been reached up to now considering the question of what is meant by inequality reduction.
In this paper we will examine three types of elementary transformations, each of which is
supposed to capture a speci¯c feature of the equalizing process. To have a better view of
the way one conceives of inequality reduction in a multidimensional context, it is helpful to
return to the initial situation involving a single attribute. In this case there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the ranking of individuals in terms of income and their ranking in
terms of well-being. If an individual is richer than another, then her well-being as measured
by any increasing utility function will be higher than the well-being achieved by the other
individual. This correspondence breaks down when there is more than one attribute because
of the multidimensionality of the attribute space. It is no longer possible to de¯ne a complete
ordering of the individual situations in the attribute space that coincides with the ranking
of these situations generated by any utility function. However it is possible to de¯ne a non-
ambiguous ranking of the individual situations in terms of well-being: one needs simply to
declare that one individual is better-o® than another if the well-being of the former is higher
than that of the latter for all non-decreasing utility functions. One then obtains a partial
ranking that reduces to the standard dominance quasi-ordering of vectors: the individual who
gets more of each attribute will be ranked above the other one by all monotone increasing
utility functions. This is our ¯rst departure from Kolm (1977) who imposes no such restric-
tions on the pairs of individuals whose situations are averaged through the application of a
bistochastic matrix. While there is no requirement in Kolm's approach that the individuals
taking part in the equalization process be unambiguously ordered in terms of their attribute
endowment, this ordering is crucial for the de¯nition of the equalizing transformations we
will consider.7
It seems quite natural to assume that, other things equal, a progressive transfer in the
cardinal attribute between two individuals who have the same endowment of the ordinal
attribute reduces inequality. For the sake of consistency with the unidimensional approach
a within-type progressive transfer { as we will call it henceforth { is the ¯rst equalizing
transformation we consider. The second transformation { which we refer to as a favorable
permutation { is implicitly contained in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982). It consists in
giving the cardinal attribute endowment of the better-o® individual in both attributes to the
7In Kolm's (1977) setting it is always possible to ¯nd two distributions and two individuals such that the
¯rst individual is better-o® than the second according to an increasing utility function while the opposite
situation occurs for another increasing utility function. The ranking of the individuals in terms of well-being
is therefore conditional upon the choice of the utility function. A good example of the conditional approach
in a framework similar to ours is Ebert (2006), who considers explicitly a two-stage process. In the ¯rst stage
a better-o® individual and a worse-o® individual are speci¯ed on the basis of a prede¯ned social norm. In the
second stage one identi¯es the properties of the utility function which guarantee that social welfare increases
when transfers in the cardinal attribute are performed between these two individuals in such a way that the
inequality in their well-being is reduced.
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worse-o® individual in both attributes and vice versa. This permutation of the endowments
in the cardinal attribute actually amounts to reducing the pairwise correlation { or positive
association { existing between the two attributes. The favorable permutation is probably
the most controversial elementary transformation we consider because it is not clear how
inequality in the distribution of the two attributes is reduced as a result. Actually it is the
inequalities of well-being between the two individuals involved in the favorable permutation
that are reduced. More precisely, it can be established that, for any monotone utility function,
the well-being of the poorer individual increases while that of the richer individual decreases
bringing them closer on the utility scale. This consequence of a favorable permutation is
reminiscent of Hammond's (1979) equity condition in an ordinal context and it is in this
respect that it may be considered to be an equalizing transformation. The between-type
progressive transfer, which is a natural extension of a progressive transfer in our particular
framework, is our third transformation. It consists in transferring an amount of the cardinal
attribute from a better-o® individual in both attributes to a worse-o® individual in both
attributes in such a way that the bene¯ciary of the transfer is not made richer than the
donor in the cardinal attribute. Contrary to a bistochastic transformation where the same
equalizing process is applied to both attributes, a between-type progressive transfer entails
redistribution in only one dimension, and this is our second point of departure from Kolm
(1977). These three transformations are elementary in the sense that it seems di±cult to
conceive of simpler inequality-reducing operations into which they could be decomposed.
Actually this is not perfectly true as far as between-type progressive transfers are concerned
and one may argue they are not as elementary as they might look at ¯rst glance. As will
be seen below, it is always possible to decompose a between-type progressive transfer into
a within-type progressive transfer coupled with a favorable permutation. But an important
quali¯cation is needed for such a decomposition to be made: one has to add a dummy
individual with appropriate endowments in both attributes. As it will become clear later
this dummy individual is only instrumental and it will be suppressed at the end of the
decomposition.
As far as the normative evaluation is concerned we take a slightly more restrictive approach
than the traditional one which consists in endowing each ethical observer with a utilitarian
social welfare functional and requiring unanimity of judgements among them. Indeed the
utilitarian rule is a particular method for making distributive judgements that shows strickly-
speaking no direct consideration of distributive justice. What matters for a utilitarian ethical
observer is the sum of the individuals' utilities and not the way these utilities are distributed
among the population. As argued by Sen (1997) it might be preferable to use more °exible
aggregation rules that pay attention to the inequality in the distribution of individual utilities.
We follow Sen and adopt the view that unanimity should be looked for over the larger family
of all utility-inequality averse welfarist social welfare functionals. The utilitarian rule clearly
belongs to this family of social welfare functionals, as do the Maximin and the Leximin ones.
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As we will show in the paper our approach is not as restrictive as it might seem at ¯rst
sight. Indeed, for a large class of utility functions, the application of unanimity among all
utility-inequality averse welfarist ethical observers provides the same ranking of distributions
as unanimity among the utilitarian ones.
Turning ¯nally to the question of the implementation of the unanimity of value judgements
we focus on two dominance criteria that have aroused contrasted interests in the profession.
The ¯rst criterion, proposed by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982), is the one that has received
the greater attention in the literature. It declares that a situation dominates another situation
if the graph of the joint distribution function of the former situation lies nowhere above that
of the latter. This condition is actually the bidimensional version of the poverty measurement
approach based on the headcount ratio: poverty as measured by the percentage of individuals
who fall below predetermined levels of the two attributes is less in the ¯rst situation than
in the second, for all possible values of the attributes' poverty lines. Bourguignon's (1989)
ordered poverty gap quasi-ordering is the second implementable criterion that we examine
in this paper. The poverty gap is computed for the cardinal attribute by assigning to each
individual a poverty line that depends negatively on her endowment of the ordinal attribute.
Other things equal, it is more di±cult for someone in good health or living in an area with
good public facilities to be considered deprived in income than for someone handicapped or
living in the slums.
The organization of the paper is as follows. We introduce in Section 2 our bidimensional
model along with our notation and preliminary de¯nitions. In Section 3 we present the
normative criteria, which will be used by the ethical observer in order to rank the distributions
under comparison. We show that the unanimity of value judgements among all utilitarian
ethical observers and all welfarist ethical observers coincide provided that the individual
utility functions possess an appropriate closedness property, which is actually satis¯ed by
all the classes of utility functions we consider throughout. Section 4 is concerned with the
¯rst model of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) and it provides the analogue to the Hardy-
Littlewood-Polya result. More precisely we show that the domination of one situation over
another is equivalent to requiring unanimity of value judgements among all welfarist ethical
observers whose marginal utility of the cardinal attribute is non-negative and decreasing in
the level of the ordinal attribute. This implies in turn that the dominating distribution can
be obtained from the dominated one by means of a ¯nite sequence of favorable permutations
of the cardinal attribute. Section 5 examines the normative foundations of Bourguignon's
(1989) ordered poverty gap dominance criterion. Introducing the additional requirement that
the utility function is concave in the cardinal attribute for ¯xed levels of the ordinal attribute
is enough to guarantee that the rankings of situations implied by the ordered poverty gap
criterion and unanimity among all welfarist ethical observers be identical. Exploiting the
possibility of adding dummy individuals to the original population allows us to show that
it is possible to derive the dominating situation from the dominated one by means of a
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¯nite sequence of within-type progressive transfers followed by a ¯nite sequence of favorable
permutations, and conversely. Section 6 concludes the paper by summarizing the main results
and hinting at possible avenues for future research.
2. Notation and Preliminary Definitions
We consider ¯nite societies, where each individual is endowed with two attributes: the ¯rst
attribute is cardinal and transferable between individuals while the second is ordinal and
cannot be transferred between individuals. To make things simple we ¯nd it convenient
to assimilate the ¯rst attribute with income and the second with ability. The latter term,
however, should not be taken too literally and it may represent the ordering of households
in terms of decreasing size (Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987)), or of individuals in terms of
health (Allison and Foster (2004)), or in terms of consumption of local public goods (Gravel,
Moyes and Tarroux (2008)). A bidimensional distribution or more compactly a situation for
a population of n individuals is a n £ 2 matrix












































½ R are respectively the income and the ability of individual i. The marginal
distributions of income and ability in situation s ´ (x;a) are indicated respectively by x :
= (x1;:::;xn)
T 2 Dn and a := (a1;:::;an)
T 2 An, where the superscript T denotes the
transposed vector. The general set of situations for a population of n individuals is denoted
as
(2.2) Sn := fs ´ (x;a) j (xi;ai) 2 D £ A; 8i = 1;2;:::;ng;
and we let ¹(x) represent the mean income in situation s ´ (x;a).
We will make extensive use in what follows of the representation of the bidimensional dis-
tributions by means of their associated joint, marginal and conditional cumulative distribution
functions. Given the situation s ´ (x;a) 2 Sn we denote as N(v;h) = fi jxi = v and ai = hg
the set of individuals who receive an income equal to v and who have an ability equal to h.
The joint density function of s ´ (x;a) is given by
(2.3) f(v;h) = n(v;h)=n; 8 v 2 D; 8 h 2 A;
where n(v;h) = #N(v;h). Similarly the set of individuals who receive an income no greater
than v and whose ability is no greater than h is indicated by Q(v;h) = fi jxi · v and ai · hg.
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Letting q(v;h) = #Q(v;h), the joint cumulative distribution function is de¯ned by
(2.4) F(v;h) = q(v;h)=n; 8 v 2 D; 8 h 2 A:
The set of individuals whose income is equal to v is denoted as N1(v) = fi jxi = vg, while
N2(h) = fi jai = hg indicates the set of individuals whose ability is equal to h. The marginal
density functions of income and ability are respectively de¯ned by
(2.5) f1(z) = n1(v)/n and f2(h) = n2(h)/n; 8 v 2 D; 8 h 2 A;
where n1(v) = #N1(v) and n2(h) = #N2(h). The set of individuals whose income in sit-
uation s ´ (x;a) is no greater than v is indicated by Q1(v) = fi jxi · vg, while the set
of individuals whose ability is no greater than h is denoted as Q2(h) = fi jai · hg. The
marginal distribution functions of income and ability are respectively de¯ned by
(2.6) F1(z) = q1(v)/n and F2(h) = q2(h)/n; 8 v 2 D; 8 h 2 A;
where q1(v) = #Q1(v) and q2(h) = #Q2(h). The conditional density functions of income
and ability are indicated by
(2.7) f1(v jh) = n(v;h)/n2(h) and f2(hjv) = n(v;h)/n1(v); 8 v 2 D; 8 h 2 A;
respectively. Let Q1(v jh) = fi jxi · v and ai = hg represent the set of individuals, whose
ability is equal to h and income no greater than v. Similarly we denote as Q2(hjv) =
fi jai · h and xi = vg the set of individuals, whose income is equal to v and ability no
greater than h. Then the conditional distribution functions of income and ability are de¯ned
by
(2.8) F1(v jh) = q1(v jh)/n2(h) and F2(hjv) = q2(hjv)/n1(v); 8 v 2 D; 8 h 2 A;
respectively, where q1(v jh) = #Q1(v jh) and q2(hjv) = #Q2(hjv).
Throughout this paper we are interested in the comparison of situations s± ´ (x±;a±);s¤ ´
(x¤;a¤) 2 Sn (n ¸ 2). The associated joint, marginal and conditional density functions and
distribution functions of s¤ and s± will be identi¯ed by means of the same superscripts. In
practice it is not necessary to consider the range of all possible values for our two attributes:
it is su±cient to make computations using the values of income and ability that actually
occur in the situations under comparison. To this aim we de¯ne:
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M1 (s) = fvj 2 D j 9i : xi = vj g ½ D; (2.9.a)
M2 (s) = fhj 2 A j 9i : ai = hj g ½ A; (2.9.b)
M1 (s¤;s±) = fvj 2 D j 9i : x¤
i = vj or x±
i = vj g ½ D; (2.9.c)
M2 (s¤;s±) = fhj 2 A j 9i : a¤
i = hj or a±
i = hj g ½ A; (2.9.d)
m1(s) := #M1 (s); (2.9.e)
m2(s) := #M2 (s); (2.9.f)
m1 (s¤;s±) := #M1 (s¤;s±); (2.9.g)
m2 (s¤;s±) := #M2 (s¤;s±); (2.9.h)
and we label the distinct elements in M1 (s), M2 (s), M1 (s¤;s±) and M2 (s¤;s±) so that v1 <
v2 < ¢¢¢ < vm1(s), h1 < h2 < ¢¢¢ < hm2(s), v1 < v2 < ¢¢¢ < vm1(s¤;s±) and h1 < h2 < ¢¢¢ <
hm2(s¤;s±), respectively.
Example 2.1. For the sake of illustration we introduce the four following situations where


































































For later reference we note that all four situations have the same marginal distribution of
ability.
On some occasion we will restrict attention to situations with the same mean income. In
the particular case where the joint distribution function of one situation lies nowhere above
the joint distribution function of the other situation, the equal mean income assumption
implies that the situations under comparison have identical marginal distribution functions
of income. This is precisely stated in the following lemma proved { as well as all formal
results in this paper { in Gravel and Moyes (2006).
Lemma 2.1. Let s¤;s± 2 Sn (n ¸ 2) and suppose that ¹(x¤) = ¹(x±). Then:
(2.10)
£





1 (v) = F±
1 (v); 8 v 2 D
¤
:
Before we examine the normative criteria which we will rely on for passing welfare judge-
ments, we would like to insist on the implications of our informational constraints for these
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assessments. Let the situations s± ´ (x±;a±), s¤ ´ (x¤;a¤), ~ s± ´ (~ x±;~ a±) and ~ s¤ ´ (~ x¤;~ a¤)
be such that
(2.11) ~ x¤
i = ® + ¯x¤
i; ~ x±
i = ® + ¯x±
i; ~ a¤
i = Á(a¤
i) and ~ a±
i = Á(a±
i);
where ® 2 R, ¯ > 0 and Á is increasing. Assuming that income is cardinally measurable
and ability ordinally measurable amounts to considering that the pairs fs¤;s±g and f~ s¤;~ s±g
convey the same information. Then all the normative criteria ¸J we will consider must have
the property that
(2.12) 8 s¤;s± 2 Sn : s¤ ¸J s± () ~ s¤ ¸J ~ s±:
In other words the normative criteria ¸J are invariant with respect to particular modi¯cations
of the measurement scales of the attributes. This informational constraint is not innocuous:
for instance, the well-known relative Lorenz quasi-ordering, which is widely used for making
inequality comparisons in the single attribute case, is not invariant with respect to a±ne
transformations of the variable.
3. The Welfare Criteria
Following the usual practice in the dominance approach, we assume (i) that all individuals
transform their endowments of two attributes into well-being by means of the same utility
function, and (ii) that the distribution of the individual utilities in a situation provides all
the relevant information for appraising this situation from a normative point of view. It is
convenient to think of an ethical observer who is in charge of evaluating the di®erent situations
under comparison on the basis of the distributions of utilities they generate. There are at least
two interpretations that can be given to this way of proceeding. The ¯rst one is the welfarist
approach according to which the utility function is the one actually used by the individuals in
order to convert their endowments of the attributes into well-being.8 It is assumed that well-
being is a cardinally measurable and interpersonnally comparable variable that summarizes
all the aspects of an individual's situation that are deemed relevant for normative evaluation.
The other interpretation { the non-welfarist approach { is to view the utility function as
re°ecting the assessment of the individual's situation by the ethical observer. There is no
presumption in the latter approach that utility is connected to the individual's actual well-
being and one must rather interpret the utility function as a prede¯ned social norm. While
the dominance approach is compatible with both interpretations, the symmetry assumption
according to which all individuals have the same utility function may look rather speci¯c.
Indeed, does a welfarist claim that all individuals convert their endowments of the attributes
into well-being by using the same utility function? Or, in the non-welfarist model, does it
8We refer the reader to Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (2005) and Gri±n (1986) for discussions of the
welfarist approach in economics and philosophy, respectively.
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mean that a bundle of attributes assigned to distinct individuals should be given the same
evaluation by the social planner? The symmetry assumption is rather easy to defend in the
non-welfarist context, provided that all the relevant individual attributes have been included.
If an individual's situation can be comprehensively described, for the purpose of normative
evaluation, by a bundle of attributes, then why should two individuals with the same bundle
of attributes be treated di®erently? The Laplacian principle of insu±cient reason would
recommend that they be treated symmetrically in absence of a convincing reason for not doing
so. The symmetry assumption is admittedly more di±cult to justify in a welfarist setting since
there is no reason a priori to assume that two individuals with the same bundle of attributes
will achieve the same level of well-being. Yet, it is possible to defend symmetry by arguing,
again, that since individuals are assumed to di®er only by their endowment of the attributes
it is natural to suppose that they convert the two attributes into well-being by means of the
same utility function. For, if they were di®erent in their ability to convert attributes into
well-being, then the variables underlying these di®erences should be considered themselves
as attributes and included in the list of arguments of the fundamental utility function, which
is by de¯nition the same for all individuals.9 A similar idea has been applied by Kolm (1972)
to preference orderings rather than to cardinally meaningful and interpersonally comparable
utility functions. While this argument is not convincing when applied to preferences that
are not assumed to be interpersonally comparable as shown by Broome (1993), we believe it
makes sense when applied to cardinally measurable and interpersonnally comparable utility
functions. These justi¯cations of the symmetrical treatment of the individuals, in either the
welfarist or non-welfarist interpretation, necessitate that the list of attributes that describe
an individual's situation is su±ciently comprehensive. Admittedly, it is very unlikely that
this requirement will be met in the two attributes case considered herein.
The utility achieved by individual i in situation s ´ (x;a) as envisaged by the ethi-
cal observer { be it welfarist or not { is indicated by U (si) = U (xi;ai). To simplify the
exposition we assume throughout that the utility function U : D £ A ! R is twice di®eren-
tiable in income and we denote as U the set of such functions.10 We use U(s) ´ U (x;a) :=
(U (x1;a1);:::;U (xn;an)) to indicate the distribution of utility generated by the situation
s ´ (x;a) 2 Sn when the utility function is U 2 U. The utilitarian rule ranks the situations
under comparison on the basis of the sum of the utilities they generate. More precisely from
the point of view of a utilitarian ethical observer endowed with the utility function U 2 U
the social welfare in situation s ´ (x;a) 2 Sn is equal to
Pn
i=1 U (xi;ai), and the situation
9A way of justifying further this argument would be to appeal to Howe's (1987) theorem according to which
each member of a collection of n distinct concave and monotonic functions of m variables can be expressed
as a projection of one concave and monotonic function of n + m variables. A di±culty with this justi¯cation
here is that the utility functions we consider need not be concave as we will see later on.
10The di®erentiability assumption is not restrictive since it is always possible in our framework to approximate
the discontinuous functions we might face in the proofs by suitable continuous and di®erentiable functions
(see Fishburn and Vickson (1978)).
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The utility function U captures the utilitarian ethical observer's normative judgement and it
is the only parameter by which such ethical observers can be distinguished. In order to rule
out as much arbitrariness as possible we require all utilitarian ethical observers whose utility
functions U belong to a given class U
¤ ½ U to agree on the ranking of the situations under
comparison.
Utilitarian Unanimity Rule. We will say that situation s¤ is no worse than situation s±
for the utilitarian unanimity rule over the class U











i); 8 U 2 U
¤:
The following obvious result, which originates in the additive separability of the utilitarian
social welfare function, expresses the independence of the utilitarian rule with respect to the
unconcerned individuals.
Lemma 3.1. Let U 2 U and consider arbitrary situations s¤;s± 2 Sn (n ¸ 2), s 2 Sq, where























The utilitarian unanimity rule allows us to encompass di®erent value judgements whose spec-
trum is fully captured by the subset U
¤ of admissible utility functions. Much of the discussion
in this paper will address the question of what constitutes the relevant set of utility functions
over which one is looking for unanimity.
However the utilitarian rule is just one among many other possible principles that can
be used for aggregating individual utility levels. It has been criticized on the grounds that
it pays no attention to the way utilities are distributed among the individuals. One might
prefer to appeal to principles that express some aversion to the inequality in the distribution
of individual utilities such as the Maximin or the Leximin. More precisely we are interested
in those social welfare functionals that incorporate a concern for both e±ciency and equity
considerations. Formally the social welfare in situation s 2 S is given by G(U(x;a)) :=
G(U (x1;a1);:::;U (xn;an)), where G : R
n ¡! R is the social welfare functional. We will
say that situation s¤ is no worse than situation s± for an ethical observer endowed with the
utility function U 2 U and the social welfare functional G, if and only if
(3.3) G(U (x¤;a¤)) ¸ G(U (x±;a±)):
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The aversion to inequality is typically captured by the property of Schur-concavity and we
indicate by GSC the set of social welfare functionals that are monotone and Schur-concave (see
Kolm (1969), Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett (1973)).11 A particularly cautious { but on the other
hand de¯nitively uncontroversial { position consists in declaring that social welfare improves
if and only if condition (3.3) holds whatever the social welfare functional and the utility
function provided the former expresses a concern for e±ciency and equity considerations.
Welfarist Unanimity Rule. We will say that situation s¤ is no worse than situation s±
for the welfarist unanimity rule over the class of utility functions U
¤ ½ U and the class of
social welfare functionals G
¤ ½ G, if and only if
(3.4) G(U (x¤;a¤)) ¸ G(U (x±;a±)); 8 U 2 U
¤; 8 G 2 G
¤:
Clearly the welfarist unanimity rule implies the utilitarian unanimity rule whatever the class
of utility functions. Actually since the converse statement does not generally hold it is more
demanding to require unanimous agreement among all welfarist ethical observers than among
all utilitarian ones. Interestingly is the fact that the utilitarian and welfarist unanimity rules
coincide over a particular subset of the utility functions. Before we proceed to a precise
statement of this result we ¯rst need to introduce some additional notation and de¯nition.
Let u¤ := (u¤
1;:::;u¤
n) and u± := (u±
1;:::;u±
n) be two distributions of individual utilities.
Denote respectively as u¤
( ) and u±







(n). Then we will say that u¤ generalised













(i); 8 k = 1;2;:::;n
(see Kolm (1969) and Shorrocks (1983)). An interesting result for our purpose is the fact
that the rankings of the distributions of utilities by the welfarist unanimity rule and the
generalised Lorenz quasi-ordering prove to be identical under certain conditions.
Lemma 3.2 (see e.g. Marshall and Olkin (1979)). Let u¤;u± 2 R
n. Then the following two
statements are equivalent:
(a) u¤ ¸GL u±.
(b) G(u¤) ¸ G(u±), for all G 2 GSC.
Given the above result it is now possible to identify the restrictions to be imposed on the class
of utility functions that guarantee that the rankings of situations implied by the utilitarian
and welfarist unanimities are identical.
11The mapping G : Rn ¡! R is Schur-concave if G(Bu) ¸ G(u), for all u = (u1;:::;un) and all bistochastic
matrices B (see Marshall and Olkin (1979)). It is monotone if G(u) ¸ G(v), for all u = (u1;:::;un) and
v = (v1;:::;vn) such that ui ¸ vi, for all i = 1;2;:::;n.
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Proposition 3.1. Let U
¤ µ U and s¤;s± 2 Sn (n ¸ 2). Then a su±cient condition for (3.2)
and (3.4) to be equivalent is that
(3.6) 8 U 2 U
¤ : [ª : R ¡! R non-decreasing and concave ] =) ª ± U 2 U
¤:
The result above indicates that in order to obtain an equivalence between utilitarian and
welfarist unanimities, it is su±cient that the class of utility functions under consideration be
closed under the operation of applying monotonic and concave { but still identical for each
individual { transformations. Since the classes of utility functions we will consider in the
next two sections possess this property, Proposition 3.1 will make things simpler by allowing
us to focus on the utilitarian unanimity rule without loss of generality.
4. Bidimensional Headcount Poverty Dominance
As we emphasized above, the in°uential contribution of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982)
is silent about the elementary equalizing transformations of situations that result in welfare
improvements in terms of the dominance criteria they introduced. Because we are primarily
interested in the way the attributes are distributed among the individuals, we will restrict
our attention in a ¯rst stage to the comparisons of situations whose marginal distribution
functions of income and ability are identical. We will say that situation s¤ is obtained
from situation s± by means of an income favorable permutation { or equivalently that s± is
obtained from situation s¤ by means of an income defavorable permutation { if there exist












g; 8 g 6= i;j: (4.1.b)
A favorable permutation consists in exchanging the cardinal attribute endowment of the
better-o® individual in both attributes with that of the worse-o® individual in both at-











= (v;k) with u < v and h < k
is represented in Figure 4.1. The permutation of the endowments in the cardinal attribute
actually reduces the correlation { or equivalently the positive association { existing between
the two attributes. The resulting situation may be considered less unequal than the original
situation in the sense that
U (x±
i;a±
































for all monotone increasing utility functions U. On the other hand a favorable permutation
has no impact on the distribution of each attribute in the population: the marginal distri-
bution functions of income and ability are left unchanged and so is mean income. The next
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result, the proof of which is obvious, identi¯es the conditions to be imposed on the utility
function for social welfare as measured by the utilitarian rule to improve as the result of a
favorable permutation.








i) whenever s¤ is
obtained from s± by means of a favorable permutation, if and only if
(C1) Uv(v;h) ¸ Uv(v;k); 8 v 2 D; 8 h;k 2 A (h < k);
where Uv(v;h) indicates the ¯rst derivative of U(v;h) with respect to income.
According to Lemma 4.1 a non-increasing marginal utility of income is necessary and su±cient
for a utilitarian ethical observer to consider that a favorable permutation results in a weak
welfare improvement. We denote as
(4.3) U1 := fU 2 U j U satis¯es (C1)g
the class of utility functions with non-increasing marginal utility of income. Atkinson and
Bourguignon (1982) have shown that the ranking of situations by the utilitarian unanimity
rule over the class U1 is actually implied by the ranking obtained by comparing the graphs
of their joint cumulative distribution functions. Precisely, we will say that situation s¤ ¯rst
order stochastic dominates situation s±, which we write as s¤ ¸FSD s±, if and only if:
(4.4) F¤(v;h) · F±(v;h); 8 v 2 D; 8 h 2 A:










2(g)H±(z jg); 8 z 2 D; 8 h 2 M2 (s¤;s±);
where
(4.6) H(z jh) :=
q1(z jg)
n2(g)
is the headcount poverty of the subpopulation of individuals having ability h in situation s.
We have represented in Figure 4.2 the joint cumulative distribution function { or equivalently
the headcount poverty curves { of situation s1 in Example 2.1. Condition (4.5) expresses the
fact that there is less poverty in situation s¤ than in situation s± for all possible values of the
bidimensional poverty line (z;h), where poverty is measured by the percentage of individuals
whose income and ability fall strictly below z and h, respectively. More precisely, we will say
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that situation s¤ headcount poverty dominates situation s±, which we write as s¤ ¸HP s±,
when condition (4.5) { equivalently condition (4.4) { holds.
Lemma 4.1, in conjunction with Atkinson and Bourguignon's (1982) result, suggests that
favorable permutations might be the elementary transformations that lie behind ¯rst order
stochastic { equivalently headcount poverty { dominance. The following result shows that
this intuition is correct under certain quali¯cations.
Lemma 4.2. Let s¤;s± 2 Sn (n ¸ 2) such that a¤ = a± and ¹(x¤) = ¹(x±). Then:









(b) s¤ is obtained from s± by means of a ¯nite sequence of favorable permutations of income.
Making use of Proposition 3.1 and Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, we obtain the following result, which
constitutes the analogue to the Hardy-Littlewood-Polya result for ¯rst order stochastic {
equivalently headcount poverty { dominance.
Theorem 4.1. Let s¤;s± 2 Sn (n ¸ 2) such that a¤ = a± and ¹(x¤) = ¹(x±). Then
statements (a), (b), (c) and (d) below are equivalent:










i), for all U 2 U1.
(c) U (x¤;a¤) ¸GL U (x±;a±), for all U 2 U1.










1 (v) = F±
1 (v), for all v 2 D;
(d-3) F¤
2 (h) = F±
2 (h), for all h 2 M2 (s¤;s±).
Sketch proof. The fact that statement (a) implies statement (b) follows from Lemma 4.1.
Proposition 3.1 and the fact that the class of utility functions U1 is closed under composition
by a non-decreasing and concave function guarantee the equivalence between statements (b)
and (c). The fact that (d) is necessary for (b) to hold can be easily shown by suitably choosing
degenerate utility functions in the class U1. Finally Lemma 4.2 establishes that statement
(d) implies statement (a). t u
Theorem 4.1 con¯rms the intuition that what we call favorable permutations are the elemen-
tary transformations that lie behind the bidimensional headcount poverty criterion. It is fair
to note that Epstein and Tanny (1980) have proven a similar result but using a di®erent ar-
gument. This, in conjunction with the fact that headcount poverty dominance is a necessary
condition for a situation to be ranked above another one by all the utilitarian ethical observers









































































































Figure 4.3.B. Joint Cumulative Distribution Functions of s1and s3
Figure 4.3.C. Joint Cumulative Distribution Functions of s1and s4 Figure 4.3.D. Joint Cumulative Distribution Functions of s2and s3
Figure 4.3.E. Joint Cumulative Distribution Functions of s2and s4 Figure 4.3.F. Joint Cumulative Distribution Functions of s3and s4
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whose marginal utility of income is non-increasing with ability, ¯lls the gaps in Atkinson and
Bourguignon's (1987) Proposition 2. A byproduct of Theorem 4.1 is the recognition that the
aforementioned result of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) goes far beyond utilitarianism
and actually holds for all monotone social welfare functionals exhibiting inequality aversion
towards the distribution of individual utilities. We have represented in Figure 4.3 the joint
cumulative distribution functions of the situations of Example 2.1. Application of the head-
count poverty criterion indicates that s2 ¸HP s1, which does not come as a surprise since
situation s2 is derived from situation s1 by means of two favorable permutations. These are
actually the only situations that can be ranked by the headcount poverty criterion, which
means that for no other pair of situations it is possible to ¯nd a general agreement among
the welfarist ethical observers whose marginal utility of income is non-increasing in ability.
So far we have restricted our attention to the case where the situations under comparison
have identical marginal distributions of income and ability. While this allows us to focus
on equity considerations, the practical relevance of the results we have obtained is limited.
Theorem 4.1 can be easily extended to the general case where the marginal distributions
are no longer ¯xed provided one is willing to introduce further restrictions on the utility
functions. We will say that situation s¤ is obtained from situation s± by means of an income








g; 8 g 6= i: (4.7.b)
We will equally say that situation s± is obtained from situation s¤ by means of an income
decrement. Contrary to a favorable permutation, which leaves the marginal distribution
of income unchanged, an income increment moves the graph of the marginal distribution
function of income downwards. Although it is immediately obvious, we ¯nd it convenient for
later purposes to state the following result.








i) whenever s¤ is
obtained from s± by means of an income increment, if and only if
(C2) Uv(v;h) ¸ 0; 8 v 2 D; 8 h 2 A:
Similarly we will say that situation s¤ is obtained from situation s± by means of an ability








g; 8 g 6= i: (4.8.b)
Clearly the graph of the marginal distribution of ability will go down as the result of an
ability increment and for later use we state the following:
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i) whenever s¤ is
obtained from s± by means of an ability increment, if and only if
(C3) U(v;h) · U(v;k); 8 v 2 D; 8 h;k 2 A(h < k):
According to Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4, the monotonicity in both arguments of the utility function
is necessary and su±cient for a utilitarian ethical observer to record income and ability
increments as welfare-improving. We use
(4.9) U
¤
1 := fU 2 U j U satis¯es (C1), (C2) and (C3)g
to indicate the class of monotone utility functions whose marginal utility of income is non-
increasing in ability, and we obtain:
Theorem 4.2. Let s¤;s± 2 Sn (n ¸ 2). Then statements (a), (b), (c) and (d) below are
equivalent:
(a) s¤ is obtained from s± by means of a ¯nite sequence of individuals' permutations, income









i), for all U 2 U
¤
1.
(c) U (x¤;a¤) ¸GL U (x±;a±), for all U 2 U
¤
1.
(d) F¤(v;h) · F±(v;h), for all v 2 D and all h 2 M2 (s¤;s±).
5. Bidimensional Ordered Poverty Gap Dominance
Here again we proceed in two steps and we ¯rst examine the case where the situations to
be compared have identical marginal distributions of income and ability. We will say that
situation s¤ is obtained from situation s± by means of a within-type progressive transfer of

















g; 8 g 6= i;j: (5.1.c)
The marginal distribution function of ability is left unchanged by a within-type progressive
transfer while the distribution of income conditional on ability is made more equal. One
can easily identify the property of the utility function that guarantees that social welfare as
measured by the utilitarian rule improves as the result of a within-type progressive transfer.
20N. Gravel and P. Moyes/Bidimensional Inequalities








i) whenever s¤ is
obtained from s± by means of a within-type progressive transfer, if and only if
(C4) Uvv(v;h) · 0; 8 v 2 D; 8 h 2 A;
where Uvv(v;h) indicates the second derivative of U(v;h) with respect to income.
The multidimensional nature of the situations under comparison plays actually no role in
the notion of a within-type progressive transfer, which is merely a restatement of the usual
Pigou-Dalton transfer in our framework. The next transformation, which fully exploits the
bidimensionality of a situation, constitutes in our model a very natural generalisation of a
unidimensional progressive transfer. We will say that situation s¤ is obtained from situation
s± by means of a between-type progressive transfer of income if there exist two individuals i

















g; 8 g 6= i;j: (5.2.c)
A between-type progressive transfer resembles a Pigou-Dalton transfer but there is a major
di®erence: the bene¯ciary of the transfer must be poorer than the donor and she must
also have a lower ability. Put di®erently, the transfer recipient must be deprived in both
dimensions { income and ability { compared to the donor. This is illustrated in Figure 5.1
where individual i receives an additional income of v ¡ u while individual j gives away an
amount of income equal to t ¡ u, where u < v < w < t, v ¡ u = t ¡ w and h < k. Both
within-type and between-type progressive transfers leave the marginal distribution of ability
unchanged. But contrary to a within-type progressive transfer, which has an unambiguous
e®ect on the conditional distribution of income, here the graph of the conditional distribution
function of income of the ability group to which the receiver belongs moves downwards, while
the opposite situation arises for the ability group of the donor. The overall e®ect on the joint
distribution function of income and ability is ambiguous and the bidimensional headcount
poverty criterion does not allow one to sign the overall welfare impact of a between-type
progressive transfer. Somewhat surprisingly, no condition in addition to the ones we have
considered up to now need to be imposed on the utility function for a between-type progressive
transfer to imply in a welfare improvement.









is obtained from s± by means of a between-type progressive transfer, if conditions (C1) and
(C4) are satis¯ed.
According to Lemma 5.2 it is su±cient for welfare as conceived by a utilitarian ethical observer
to increase as the result of a between-type progressive transfer that the marginal utility of












































CN. Gravel and P. Moyes/Bidimensional Inequalities
income be non-increasing in income and in ability. The corresponding class of utility functions
is indicated by
(5.3) U2 := fU 2 U j U satis¯es (C1) and (C4)g:
Contrary to what happens with the elementary transformations we introduced previously {
in particular the favorable permutations of income { it is not clear whether the conditions we
obtain here are also necessary for a between-type progressive transfer to result in a welfare
improvement.12
Bourguignon (1989) introduced a dominance criterion that coincides with the one which
commands unanimity over all utilitarian ethical observers who use a utility function that is
non-decreasing and concave in income and whose marginal utility in income is non-increasing
in ability. In order to de¯ne Bourguignon's (1989) criterion, we ¯rst need to introduce
additional notation and technicalities. An ordered poverty line is a non-decreasing mapping
z : A ¡! D such that z(h) 2 D is the poverty line assigned to all the individuals whose
abilities are equal to h. The poverty line faced by an individual is no longer exogenously
given as in the standard unidimensional framework but it depends now on her personal
situation. The ordered poverty gap in situation s ´ (x;a) 2 Sn, when the ordered poverty


















is the conditional poverty gap of the group of individuals with ability equal to h when the
poverty line is set to z(h). The ordered poverty gap inherits all the properties of the usual










to illustrate the de¯nition above we have represented in Figure 5.2 the ordered poverty gap
curves of situation s1 in Example 2.1. There are two ability groups { say the handicapped
(h = 1) and the healthy (h = 2) { and thus two poverty lines z(1) and z(2). Given the
properties of the poverty gap curves and since z(1) ¸ z(2) there are four ordered poverty
gap curves corresponding to the convex piecewise linear lines AB, DE, EG and HI. Actually
the curve AB is nothing but the conditional poverty gap curve of the group of handicapped
12Ebert (2000) makes use of a continuity argument to show that a decreasing in ability marginal utility of
income and concavity with respect to income are also necessary for the sum of utilities to increase as the
result of a between-type progressive transfer.
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individuals weighted by their corresponding population share. Similarly the piecewise linear
line AC represents the weighted conditional poverty gap curve of the group of healthy indi-
viduals. Summing the curves AB and AC we obtain the curve AJ which is the integral of
the marginal distribution of income or equivalently the poverty gap for the whole population
of individuals irrespective of their type. We will say that situation s¤ ordered poverty gap
dominates situation s±, which we write as s¤ ¸OPG s±, if and only if:
(5.6) P(z;(x¤;a¤)) · P(z;(x±;a±)); 8 z such that z(h) is non-increasing in h:
De¯nition (5.4) makes clear that the ordered poverty gap is the weighted sum of the condi-
tional poverty gaps, where the weights are equal to the marginal densities of ability. For later
reference we will say that situation s¤ conditional poverty gap dominates situation s±, which
we write as s¤ ¸CPG s±, if and only if:
(5.7) P¤ (z jh) · P± (z jh); 8 z 2 D; 8 h 2 M2 (s¤;s±):
When the situations under comparison have identical marginal distributions of ability, it
is immediately clear that conditional poverty gap dominance implies ordered poverty gap






= P(z;s¤) + P(z;s±); 8 s¤ 2 Sn; 8 s± 2 Sq (n;q ¸ 1):
The next result, which is a direct consequence of the additive separability of the ordered
poverty gap, will play a crucial role in subsequent developments.
Lemma 5.3. For all s¤;s± 2 Sn (n ¸ 2) and all s 2 Sq (q ¸ 1), we have:
(5.9) s¤ ¸OPG s± () (s¤;s)
T ¸OPG (s±;s)
T :
The following is nothing but a restatement of well-know results in the unidimensional case
(see Berge (1963), Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1952), Marshall and Olkin (1979)).
Lemma 5.4. Let s¤;s± 2 Sn (n ¸ 2) such that a¤ = a± and ¹(x¤) = ¹(x±). Then s¤ ¸CPG s±
implies that s¤ is obtained from s± by means of a ¯nite sequence of within-type progressive
transfers of income.
Our last lemma will play a decisive role in the proof of our main result: it is a separation
result, which states that ordered poverty gap domination can always be decomposed into
headcount poverty and conditional poverty gap dominations.13
13Analogous results are well-known in the unidimensional setting where generalised Lorenz domination is
decomposed into ¯rst order stochastic domination and Lorenz domination (see e.g. Marshall and Olkin
(1979)).
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Lemma 5.5. Let s¤;s± 2 Sn (n ¸ 2) such that a¤ = a± and ¹(x¤) = ¹(x±) and s 2 Sq




if and only if there exist two situations ~ s 2 Sn and ^ s 2 Sq such that
(5.11) (s¤;s)
T ¸HP (~ s;^ s)
T ¸CPG (s±;s)
T :
Making use of Lemma 3.1, Proposition 3.1, Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, and Lemmas 5.1 to 5.5,
we obtain the following theorem, which reveals the normative foundations of Bourguignon's
(1989) ordered poverty gap quasi-ordering.
Theorem 5.1. Let s¤;s± 2 Sn (n ¸ 2) such that a¤ = a± and ¹(x¤) = ¹(x±). Then
statements (a), (b), (c) and (d) below are equivalent:
(a) There exists q ¸ 1 and a situation s 2 Sq such that (s¤;s)
T is obtained from (s±;s)
T










i), for all U 2 U2.
(c) U (x¤;a¤) ¸GL U (x±;a±), for all U 2 U2.
(d-1) P(z;(x¤;a¤)) · P(z;(x±;a±)); 8 z such that z(h) is non-increasing in h;
(d-2) F¤
2 (h) = F±
2 (h), for all h 2 M2 (s¤;s±).


















for all U 2 U2, which by Lemma 3.1 is equivalent to statement (b). Proposition 3.1 and the
fact that the class of utility functions U2 is closed under composition by an non-decreasing
and concave function guarantee the equivalence between statements (b) and (c). The fact that
(d) is necessary for (b) to hold can be easily shown by suitably choosing degenerate utility
functions in the class U2. Invoking the separability of the ordered poverty gap dominance
criterion (see Lemma 5.3) we deduce from statement (d) that
(5.13) (s¤;s)
T ¸OPG (s±;s)




Using Lemma 5.5 we deduce from (5.13) that there exists a situation (~ s;^ s)
T such that
(5.14) (s¤;s)
T ¸HP (~ s;^ s)
T ¸CPG (s±;s)
T :
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Finally Lemmas 4.2 and 5.4 establish that (5.14) implies statement (a), which makes the
argument complete. t u
The equivalence between the unanimous agreement among all utilitarian ethical observers
whose marginal utility of income is non-increasing in both attributes and ordered poverty gap
dominance was ¯rst established by Bourguignon (1989). However the normative meaning of
this result is somewhat obscured by the fact that the nature of the underlying elementary
transformations, that are needed to transform the dominated situation into the dominating
one, was not revealed. Also the ingenious technique of proof employed by Bourguignon (1989)
relied on the introduction of auxiliary functions whose meaning is unclear. Theorem 5.1 is
motivated by these critiques but we have to admit that the answer it provides is not totally
satisfactory. Indeed in order to identify the elementary transformations, which successive
applications of allow one to derive the dominating situation from the dominating one, it may
be the case that we have to introduce a virtual situation. Actually it is not always necessary
to have recourse to such a ¯ctitious situation to prove the equivalence between statements
(a) and (d). Thanks to the separability of the di®erent normative criteria we appeal to, the
virtual situation plays only an instrumental role in the derivation of our result. There is a
strong presumption that this instrumental situation actually mirrors the auxiliary functions
used by Bourguignon (1989) in his proof.
Leaving aside the fact that we do not provide a means for identifying with precision the
virtual situation, the main limitation of Theorem 5.1 is that it is silent as far as between-type
progressive transfers are concerned. Indeed, we know from Lemma 5.2 that all utilitarian
ethical observers, whose marginal utility of income is non-increasing in income and abil-
ity, will consider that a between-type progressive transfer results in improvement in social
welfare. However we have not succeeded in showing that a ¯nite sequence of such trans-
formations enables the dominated situation to be transformed into the dominating one, nor
have we been able to prove that this is impossible. All we have shown is that it is possible
to transform the dominated situation into the dominating situation { where both situations
are augmented by the virtual situation { by means of favorable permutations and within-
type progressive transfers. This is a challenging question because a between-type progressive
transfer can always be decomposed into a within-type progressive transfer followed by a fa-
vorable permutation provided one adds a ¯ctitious individual endowed with the income of the
bene¯ciary and the ability of the donor prior to the transfer. This is illustrated in Figure 5.3
which describes the three steps involved in this decomposition process. To simplify things,



































where u < v < w < t, v ¡ u = t ¡ w = ¢ and h < k. Consider now an individual g whose







= (u;k). Adding individual g to the initial population







. Individuals g and j have the same




















































































































Figure 5.4.C. Ordered Poverty Gap Curves of    s1and s4





Figure 5.4.D. Ordered Poverty Gap Curves of    s2and s3
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ability but individual j is richer than individual g. Taking an income amount ¢ > 0 from















by means of a within-type progressive transfer. Observe that in-
dividual i is deprived in both income and ability compared to individual g. Exchanging the















by means of a favorable permutation. Individual g is back to her initial
situation so that she actually played only an instrumental part in the decomposition. We







= (v;h), which would have led to
a within-type progressive transfer from individual g to individual i followed by a favorable
permutation of income between individuals g and j.
The ordered poverty gap curves of the situations of Example 2.1 are indicated in Figure
5.4 on a pairwise basis. Application of condition (d-1) of Theorem 5.1 allows us to obtain a
decisive verdict in all possible pairs of situations but one, namely
©
s3;s4ª
. That s3 ¸OPG s2
can readily be anticipated from the fact that situation s3 is obtained from situation s2 by
means of a favorable permutation involving individuals 1 and 5. Similarly it is not a surprise
that s3 ¸OPG s1 since ordered poverty gap dominance is compatible with headcount poverty
dominance. On the other hand the fact that s4 ¸OPG s2 is at ¯rst sight unexpected given
the way the situations in Example 2.1 have been constructed.14 However close inspection
reveals that s4 can be directly obtained from s2 by means of a within-type progressive transfer
involving individuals 1 and 3 followed by a favorable permutation of the incomes of individuals
1 and 4. This provides an instance where there is no need of introducing an auxiliary situation
in order to derive the dominating situation from the dominated one by means of favorable
permutations and within-type progressive transfers.
While Theorem 5.1 is concerned with situations with identical income and ability marginal
distributions, it is easy to extend it to the general case of variable marginal distributions if
one is willing to introduce additional restrictions on the utility functions. Speci¯cally we
consider the following class of utility function:
(5.15) U
¤
2 := fU 2 U j U satis¯es (C1), (C2), (C3) and (C4)g:
Dispensing with the restrictions that the situations under comparison have identical marginal
distributions we obtain:
Theorem 5.2. Let s¤;s± 2 Sn (n ¸ 2). Then statements (a), (b), (c) and (d) below are
equivalent:
14Actually two transformations of equal magnitudes but whose impacts on social welfare go in opposite direc-
tions are needed to convert situation s4 into situation s3. The favorable permutation consisting in exchanging
the incomes of individuals 1 and 4 results in a welfare improvement, while the defavorable permutation between
individuals 3 and 5 of the same amounts unambiguously decreases welfare. The net e®ect on social welfare
of these two transformations is therefore ambiguous unless one is prepared to impose additional restrictions
on the utility functions.
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(a) There exists q ¸ 1 and a situation ~ s 2 Sq such that (s¤;~ s)
T is obtained from (s±;~ s)
T by
means of a ¯nite sequence of individuals' permutations, income increments, ability increments,









i), for all U 2 U
¤
2.
(c) U (x¤;a¤) ¸GL U (x±;a±), for all U 2 U
¤
2.
(d-1) P(z;(x¤;a¤)) · P(z;(x±;a±)); 8 z such that z(h) is non-increasing in h;
(d-2) F¤
2 (h) · F±
2 (h), for all h 2 M2 (s¤;s±).
6. Concluding Remarks
The aim of the paper was to investigate the normative foundations of two implementable cri-
teria { the so-called headcount poverty and ordered poverty gap quasi-orderings { designed
for comparing distributions of two attributes, one of which { income { is cardinally mea-
surable while the other { ability { is ordinal. Our ambition was to provide in each case an
equivalence result analogous to the celebrated Hardy-Littlewood-Polya theorem in the unidi-
mensional framework. More precisely we wanted (i) to identify the class of utility functions
such that all welfarist ethical observers, whose value judgements belong to this class, rank the
situations under comparison in the same way as the dominance criterion, and (ii) to uncover
the elementary transformations ¯nite applications of which permit to derive the dominating
situation from the dominated one.
A marginal utility of income that is non-increasing in ability ensures that the welfarist
unanimity rule and the headcount poverty quasi-ordering rank the situations in the same
way, while a favorable permutation is the transformation which, if applied a ¯nite number
of times, allows one to derive the dominating situation from the dominated one. As far
as the headcount poverty { and equivalently, ¯rst order stochastic dominance { criterion is
concerned Theorem 4.1 provides the desired equivalence. Things are far less satisfactory in
the case of the ordered poverty gap dominance criterion since we did not manage to establish
an equivalence in Theorem 5.1 without resorting to the adjunction of a virtual situation.
Using this technical device we were able to show that repeated applications of favorable
permutations and within-type progressive transfers allow one to transform the dominated
situation into the dominating one. On the other hand, we know that all welfarist ethical
observers, whose marginal utilities of income is non-increasing in both income and ability,
will record as welfare-improving a between-type progressive transfer. But it is still an open
question whether it is possible or not to obtain the dominating situation from the dominated
one by means of between-type progressive transfers without resorting to dummy individuals.
Other limits of the present analysis concern the number of attributes considered and
also the informational assumptions we made. Focusing on just two attributes is certainly
restrictive and does not allow us to capture all the relevant dimensions of a person's well-
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being. The HDI is a good example of an aggregate measure focusing on three essential factors
that contribute to a person's well-being: income, life expectancy and literacy. Increasing
the number of dimensions is certainly one direction to go but such an extension is likely to
become quickly quite involved. To give but an example, the notion of correlation, which lies at
the heart of the concept of a favorable permutation, needs to be substantially reformulated
when more than two attributes are considered. Suppose there are three attributes as in
the HDI case: then the welfare impact of a favorable permutation involving the ¯rst and
second attribute will depend on the quantity of the third attribute received by the individuals
involved in the transformation.15 Also the question arises to know if it could be possible to
adapt Bourguignon's (1989) approach in order to rank situations involving only cardinal
attributes as it is done in Kolm (1977) or Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982).
There is a general skepticism concerning the ability of the dominance approach to provide
relevant information because of the incomplete nature of the quasi-orderings it relies on. The
non-decisiveness of this approach is accentuated in the multi-attribute case and it is expected
to be the more serious as the number of dimensions increases. The criteria we investigate in
this paper are no exceptions and to some extent they may be considered as a ¯rst step that
has to supplemented by the use of multidimensional cardinal indices, for instance like those
characterized in Ebert (1995). However, to conclude on a more positive note, it is worth
mentioning that the criteria we have examined provide conclusive verdicts in a non-negligible
number of cases as the evidence in Gravel, Moyes and Tarroux (2008) shows.
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